irony the principal mindset. Spivak, for example, restricts the human to a specifically ethical and intellectual mode. However, if we take her reasoning to its logical conclusion, many of the "transcendental figurations" reduced by deconstruction to mere effects of discourse must also be rethought as specifically human, universal dispositions. The most powerful of these are the dispositions toward love (the erotic), toward beauty (the aesthetic), and toward belief (the religious). The anthropological turn in critical thinking and the arts is thus more than just a belated correction of a small blind spot in the postmodern episteme. Rather, in its broadest implications, it shifts our entire mode of thinking from one of critical irony to one of anthropological affirmation. This kind of affirmation is perhaps no less "impossible" in global terms than Spivak's deconstructive project. However, it is infused by an entirely different logic than that which guides the still influential poststructuralist theories and still prevailing postmodern strategies. In short, it marks the beginning of a saliently different episteme whose contours are becoming ever sharper with the passage of time.
This is also the starting point of my own approach to planetary relations. Like Spivak, I am skeptical of both technocratic and ecological approaches suggesting that either technical innovations (electronic media) or a common theme (the environment) will transgress all linguistic and ideological boundaries and somehow bring us closer on a planetary scale. And, also like Spivak, I do not look to traditional humanism as a source of inspiration or value. It is not enough to simply postulate the return of love, beauty, and belief in a human guise. Rather, our goal must be to work out, as precisely as possible, the way the human is now being constructed in the arts on a global scale, and to examine how those constructs interact with our perceptions of political and social reality. In the last dozen years or so, based on analyses of numerous media, genres, and individual works, I have developed a theory called performatism, which sets forth the minimal requirements of this new, anthropologically founded episteme. 4 Because I have treated performatism at length elsewhere, I will not outline it in detail here. However, because the theory can be expressed in terms of two minimal propositions, it can be introduced quickly to those unfamiliar with it.
In the emerging episteme of performatism, to begin with, the human appears as a unified bio-social construct (it is neither entirely natural nor is it entirely an effect of discourse). Obviously, the details of the human or humans as construct or constructs vary from case to case. However, they all share one common trait: they have a primarily mimetic and intuitive, rather than a discursive and intellectual, motivation. "Mimesis" is used here in the way that it is understood by René Girard and Eric Gans: it assumes that foundational or primary forms of human interaction occur through imitation of others. Such imitation has both a violent and a reconciliatory potential and is prior to all discourse (you do not need language to imitate the actions of an other, who in mimetic terms is always a potential rival). 5 One can make this clearer by contrasting the mimetic approach to Spivak's notion of the human. In her view, which follows the so-called ethical turn commencing in the late 1980s, the human subject is "intended toward the other," and this relation is mediated by a discourse that occludes access to that other as much as it enables it. Hence the emphasis on grappling with an alterity that paradoxically "contains us as much as it flings us away" and on "educat[ing] ourselves into this peculiar mindset." 6 Hence also the insistence in practical terms on reading, on "inviting the kind of language training that would disclose the irreducible hybridity of all languages," and on having graduate students learn the subaltern "languages of the Southern Hemisphere." 7 Spivak's "impossible" planetary project, in short, works by unceasingly interrogating the refractory interface with the other that is discourse. The immediate result is a "pluralization [that] may allow the imagining of a necessary yet impossible planetarity." 8 In the performatist episteme, by contrast, the human is conditioned not by the belatedness and particularity of discourse, but by the originary experience of mimesis and intuition prior to discourse. In their constructs of the human, performatist narratives tend to privilege characters who have trouble using discourse (hence the prevalence of taciturn, simple-minded, and autistic characters) or to forefront visual, intuitive forms of communication at the expense of discourse by allowing discursively deficient characters to prevail within the work as a whole. One case in point is Mark Haddon's novel The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2003) , in which the hero, who suffers from a mild form of autism, lacks the ability to use language in anything but a literal way and yet triumphs in the end. 9 Another common strategy is to construct works in such a way that a discursive critique or deconstruction is easily achieved but leads to nothing in the way of understanding the text. Thus, in works like Ian McEwan's Atonement (2001) or Yann Martell's Life of Pi (2001) , we realize at the end that a narrating character has been lying to us-but we do not care, because the aesthetic power of the preceding stories has forced us into a position of wanting to believe rather than of wanting to be skeptical. 10 While it seems "impossible" from a poststructuralist or postmodern perspective to forego or marginalize discourse, this is precisely what performatism doesand also what makes it irreducible to postmodernism. As I will show further on, this occlusion of discourse opens the way for a planetary approach that does not become bogged down in the particularities of local discourse every step of the way.
In critical practice, this necessitates a shift from poststructuralist theories emphasizing discourse to theories aimed at mimesis and the intuition. Girard's scapegoat theory, Gans's generative anthropology, Jean-Luc Marion's post-metaphysical phenomenology, and Peter Sloterdijk's spherology, to name the most notable, all address these issues directly and in depth (it goes almost without saying that all are marginal or play no role at all in presentday academic discussions in the arts). 11 Both in artistic practice and in theory, the human is no longer restricted to a merely ethical mode, but now includes originary aesthetic, erotic, and religious attributes derived specifically from the mimetic and intuitive interaction between humans. This non-discursive interaction, in turn, achieves results that poststructuralism rejects as "metaphysical" or simply chimerical. Most notably, these include the experience of successful, unifying identification with an other (occurring when someone's mimetic gesture is successfully picked up and used by someone else), the experiencing of presence (triggered by the transparent immediacy and efficacy of the successful mimetic transfer between two humans), and the experiencing of totality (caused by imposing formal closure on a field of experience). The unthinkable, transcendent "others" of postmodern practice and poststructuralist theory-unity, presence, and totality-are made real in art through the performative occlusion of discourse.
12 Discourse, language, and translatability remain practical problems, but ones that can be bridged, albeit imperfectly, through mimesis. The mimetic transfer of value between humans-and not the endlessly obscure discourse of those humans-becomes the principal focus of attention. 13 At the same time, though, mimesis contains a raw potential for violence that continually undercuts the contractual solutions to human strife produced by Enlightenment and Reason. For this reason mimetic theories like performatism or Gans's generative anthropology assume that violence is an originary, insoluble aspect of human existence-and, concurrently, that transcending that violence is an imperative of human existence, albeit one that cannot be fulfilled entirely. This peculiar focus on the ever-present potential for violence, on the one hand, and the impossible need to transcend it, on the other, distinguishes performatism from critical poststructuralist theories (which are dedicated to dismantling the illusion of transcendence and avoid addressing "foundational" problems like violence directly) and humanist ones (which assume that violence can be resolved through contractual means or by resorting to reason).
The second distinguishing feature of performatism-its dominant technique-is what I call double framing. Double framing operates by taking some particular element in a work-usually an odd or unbelievable scene, situation, or detail, sometimes also an odd bio-social disposition-and confirming its mimetic or intuitive logic on the level of the work as a whole. The reader or viewer is in effect faced with a self-confirming construct that forces him or her to accept formally a scenic or visual given that is prima facie unbelievable or dubious in terms of prevailing discursive logic.
14 A good narrative example is the movie American Beauty (1999), which in purely discursive terms seems to be nothing more than an ironic, scathing satire of "ugly" American suburban life. The film narrative, however, concludes by linking a single odd scene (the twirling plastic bag Ricky Fitts calls animated, beautiful, and benevolent) with Lester Burnham's posthumous speech, which not only repeats Ricky's words verbatim but also suggests we can only appreciate the beauty of the world after we, too, have died. Lester's and Ricky's "unbelievable" intuitions do not completely occlude the discursive critique of American middle-class life contained in the film, but they provide a strongand in fact logically irrefutable-counterpoint to that critique by offering a metaphysically optimistic perspective that practically forces us to believe (at least within the formal confines of the work). The film makes us experience transcendence as performance, which is to say through specifically aesthetic or artificial means whose universal-one might also say planetary-validity has yet to be fulfilled. Granted, it is possible to "ignore" this experience, but only at the expense of ignoring the form of the work itself.
The double frame imposes upon us a tautological, mimetically or intuitively defined free space that separates itself willfully from the boundless field of discourse, in the same way the human in its mimetic or intuitive mode is separate from discourse. This free space implicitly-and sometimes also explicitly-instantiates both the aesthetic and the transcendent as core elements of the human. By raising formally separated, idiosyncratic instances of mimetic and intuitive experience to a higher, more complex formal level, which always necessarily includes some form of discourse, performatist works force viewers or readers to believe in an artificial, closed construct (as opposed to having them "dis-figure" an endless skein of discursive figurations). Viewers and readers can always resist the logic of these closed aesthetic constructs in intellectual terms. However, intuitively they have little choice but to identify with what is being projected onto them. In short, the act of receiving the aesthetic construct is experienced formally as an act of transcendence-the viewer or reader is remade through the form of the work (per formam). Similarly, the palpably artificial, often highly manipulative way in which this transferral is conducted points to the existence of a higher authorial power rather than to the endless regress of discourse into which the postmodern author is usually said to disappear. The authorial position in performatism marks the point of undecidability between the human as a selfconstructing force and as a construct received from a higher, as yet unknown (theist) source. The degree to which authoriality and the apprehension of transcendence are projected and experienced varies from work to work, but both are fundamental to the new episteme. 15 All in all, the strategy of double framing occludes the endless proliferation, pluralization, and dissemination peculiar to discourse by forcibly imposing artificial, closed categories onto its seemingly endless, open field. Whereas in Spivak's "classical" planetarity the focus is on the discursive figure, in performatist planetarity it is on the category or frame, which imposes a certain problematic aesthetic and political order on the global field of human relations while at the same time reopening the horizon of transcendence for the human via the frame.
Just how widespread is the performatist paradigm in narrative? My own, necessarily selective interpretations in Performatism, or the End of Postmodernism (2008) suggest that it started in the mid-1990s and became ubiquitous as of the mid-2000s. However, it is perhaps most convincing if the reader simply takes the criteria outlined above and applies them herself to the narrative works she has read or viewed in the last five years or so. Do these works stress discursive competence or occlude it? Do these works highlight freewheeling boundary transgression or impose frames and categories on characters? Do these works imply we are caught in an endless regress of irony or do they provide specific narrative resolutions transcending that irony? Are the actions of characters in these works dependent on outside discourse or do they exhibit simple forms of agency that are uniquely their own? If your answers consistently land on the latter part of the binary options listed, you will begin to intuit yourself that we are dealing with an epistemic shift toward a new epoch and not with random permutations in an endless regress of post-historical filiations.
Archetypologies: A Planetary Perspective on the Episode Film
Performatist planetarity is, as already noted, no less "impossible" than Spivak's anthropologically revised brand of deconstruction in the sense that its "God's-eye view" can never be realized entirely or thought separately from the particulars that it encompasses. It does, however, open up entirely different possibilities for approaching planetary relations in the arts. These possibilities are in no way ideal or utopian-they are inevitably accompanied by a kind of quid pro quo with discursive logic that will always make their full realization "impossible"-but they occur in a mode of affirmation that is foreign to the anthropologically supplemented poststructuralism propounded by Spivak and many others. As noted above, this mode of affirmation allows the experiencing of unity, presence, and totality in a way that is quite literally unthinkable in postmodernism and poststructuralism. In the following remarks I would like to develop a planetary perspective for performatism using Alejandro Iñárritu's movie Babel (2006) as a point of departure.
As an "impossible" gesture, performatist planetarity suggests the possibility of an affirmatively conceived global relationality among humans that is unthinkable in its entirety. It is therefore all the more interesting to address a case in which this "impossible" point of view is brought into play nonetheless. This case is the movie Babel. The work belongs to a cycle of recent films that radically garble or interrupt narrative sequences while in the end linking together what at first seem to be entirely disconnected episodes or strands of plot. 16 Rather than radically diffusing our sense of linear time by allowing "sheets" of time to overlap fluidly (as described by Deleuze in regard to, say, Andrei Tarkovsky's The Mirror [1975] or Alain Resnais's Last Year in Marienbad [1961] 17 ), these movies all reorder time in such a way that linearity, although radically interrupted and scrambled, can be reconstructed after the fact. The emphasis lies on presenting time in discrete, temporarily disconnected chunks that are experienced all the more intensely because they at first appear to have no connection to a greater telos or to the other narrative segments to which they are juxtaposed. The formal discreteness of the time chunks and the intensity which they convey lead, one way or the other, to a specifically aesthetic experience of temporal and spatial immediacy. This temporal reordering and aesthetic immediacy is experienced by the viewer as specifically authorial and artificial, in the sense that it has neither a psychological (dreamlike or hallucinatory) nor a semiotic motivation (it is not the result of linear film narrative being broken up because images interact uncontrollably with other images by way of audiovisual associations).
18 Quite simply, it can only be explained as the willed effect of a higher force-an author-and it confronts us with the question as to why such an author is imposing this radical new order upon us. This kind of movie plays out to a lesser or greater degree the ambivalence between authoriality and theism noted above. Is the work "merely" the whim of a strong-willed author or is the strongly conceived work the symptom of a still higher force that we cannot yet entirely comprehend? The fact that these movies can all be logically reordered in the end in spite of all initial confusion implies that there is. Moreover, the aesthetically charged individual chunks or scenes of the movie tend to be set off in a way that indicates that there is a unity of experience on a lower level, which is necessarily congruent with unity of experience on a higher narrative or structural level (the double frame noted above). The degree to which this necessity is felt depends a great deal on the particulars of the given movie, but it is a defining feature that sets these more recent episode films apart from comparable works from the 1960s or 1970s.
Babel takes these basic strategies and raises them to a global level. The film sets in motion three internally linear plot lines (in Morocco, the MexicanAmerican borderlands, and Japan) that are continually juxtaposed with one another on the narrative level but which eventually prove to be out of sync on the story level (there is no way of determining their temporal and causal relations until near the end of the film; the Japanese story line, for example, runs four or five days after the Moroccan story line has ended, and the Mexican-American story line takes place immediately after the end of the Moroccan one). The specific selection and positioning of the time chunks can be explained only by reference to an author-a specifically human point of origin-and not to the signs or discourse that in poststructuralist thinking always already conditions that point of origin before it even begins. The film asserts itself as a specifically human construct whether we like it or not, and it takes our ability to understand the authorship of the human to its outermost limits. 19 The movie not only scrambles time, but also juxtaposes four extremely different cultures. There is a comfortable and leisurely American "suburbanscape"; the dirt-poor, austere peasant life of Morocco; an upper-middle-class Japanese milieu marked by high tech, neon, and the impersonal coolness of Tokyo's urban ambience; and, finally, the vibrant disorder of Iñárritu's native Mexico. Although dissimilar in almost every conceivable way, each of these cultural venues has its own peculiar aesthetic and achieves its own kind of dignity through that aesthetic. Iñárritu and his cameraman Rodrigo Prieto use the natural grandeur of the Moroccan mountains and their intimate acquaintance with Mexican local color to full effect, but they are no less generous in their cinematic presentation of Tokyo's skyline, street life, and interiors, avoiding as they do both the clichéd Japan of Lost in Translation (2003) and the easily achieved critique of urban haste in Koyaanisqatsi (1982) . (This applies no less to the short American suburban segment, which is marked by the inner warmth and child-friendly clutter of the home.) Through slow, panoramic pans, nature (the Moroccan mountains) is presented as equivalent to culture (the Tokyo skyline) and the other way around, with the Mexican scenes containing a carnivalesque jumble of both. On the other end of the scale, all three venues are implicitly connected by detailed close-ups of quotidian objects (most notably water, wells, fountains, animals etc.) that speak to a planetary commonality between cultures at the most elemental level.
This aesthetic framing and affirmation of local particularities is accompanied by a categorically, rather than discursively, guided construction of the human. This asserts itself through what I would like to call archetypologies. These are authorially framed, aesthetically sublimated chunks of reality that are particular and local and yet also seem to have a primordial, archetypal core. Babel and other performatist works present us with templates for perceiving reality that are circumscribed, bounded, and particular but that at the same time remain anchored in what appears to be timeless scenes or situations open to the intuition rather than to discourse. Archetypologies are hence more than mere empirical typologies and less than universal archetypes: they are categories with an originary "feel" but lacking an a priori justification, as is the case, I might add, with C. G. Jung's archetypes, which are always already "there" in the collective unconscious waiting to unfold through individuation, or with Northrop Frye's archetypal criticism, which would reduce all literary forms to a set of fixed, quasi-organic categories. Summing up, one could say that archetypologies are free-floating, aesthetically generated frames or categories rooted in direct modes of human interaction underpinned primarily by the intuition and mimesis; they are symptomatic of a broader epistemic mindset that has become impatient with approaching human reality through the endless critique of discourse. Archetypologies make possible a planetary approach to culture by generating overarching categories that allow us to compare different cultures in their mimetic and intuitive operations beneath the threshold of discourse.
We can observe the way these archetypologies work at first hand in Babel. At first, the differences between the various characters seem to outweigh any similarities, in particular because they bear the typical imprints of their own cultures. Culture, in turn, appears as a unity of nature and socially normed artifice that frames the characters in very different ways. This can be seen most directly in the way that sexual drives are presented. The literally most visible instance is that of the exhibitionism practiced by Chieko and Yussef's sister Zohra. In social terms the circumstances are completely different: the emotionally traumatized Chieko exposes herself to strangers in anonymous urban settings, whereas Zohra exposes herself to Yussef in a semi-incestuous way that is no doubt motivated by the goatherd family's extreme isolation (in accordance with utterly different social norms Chieko goes unpunished even when she exposes herself to a policeman, whereas Yussef and Zohra are beaten by their father). The causal logic of the film strongly suggests, however, that we must regard (natural) sexuality and culturally mediated agency as a kind of bio-social unity. For example, the film makes a direct connection between Yussef's sexual drive and his desire to use the hunting rifle (he is masturbating when his brother calls him to go shoot). There is also a less explicit suggestion that the Japanese father's status as a hunter/loner contributed to his wife's suicide (she killed herself with a gun and was found by Chieko, leading to the latter's trauma). Sexual desire is channeled into certain social actions that take place within the framework of local norms and moral categories, and that in turn may have natural repercussions (wounding, death) that once again merge into social acts. Through an irresistible, authorial, totalizing gesture the film renders these very different bio-social acts equivalent without suggesting any sort of intrinsic superiority of one over the other; they are offered to us as visual pieces of evidence rather than as discursive conundrums. At the same time, on a root level and in spite of all local differences, Babel suggests that all cultures function in a similar, mimetic way-in the presence of face-to-face encounters. Language-as hinted at by the "Babel" of the movie's title-gets in the way of this mimetic interaction all the time, but this interference is, in spite of the symbolically loaded title, not the movie's central interest.
This can be seen in the specific ways in which language is thematized within the film itself. While linguistic problems impede communication in a number of instances, most notably when the American husband in Morocco aggressively tries to get medical help for his wounded wife, language itself does not seem to be an unbridgeable gap (the husband is helped by a loyal and very patient local guide and translator). The Mexican nanny Emilia calms her young charges at bedtime by speaking Spanish with them (which they appear to understand). It is also probably no accident that the film makes a point of treating language as a bio-social, rather than as a simply encultured phenomenon: the Japanese teenager Chieko is a deaf-mute who communicates through lip-reading, sign language, and writing. Forcing others to communicate with her face-to-face, her disability underscores the reduction of language to an originary state of visual contact and presence. The film seems to be saying that understanding, rather than being a linguistic or even cultural problem, is based on the willingness to respond mimetically to an other's distress, that is, to react sympathetically to his or her immediate emotional state or situation. I might also point out that the role played by the media in all this is contingent. Various mediatic forms from long-distance phones and cell phones with video functions to television make instant communication with faraway partners possible, but the essentials of communication always take place face-to-face or locally (as when Detective Mamiya reads Chieko's note shortly after their meeting). In Babel, the privileged medium of planetarity is definitely film, which is able to combine the local and particular with an overarching narrative perspective that overrides language. Film makes its case to us by appealing to the intuition (from intuere, "to look at"), which is prior to language; it argues by presenting us chunks of visual evidence rather than devolving into an endless skein of discursive figures.
If "Babel" in the biblical sense does not explain the movie very well, what, then, is the causal logic behind its plot? Many critics have remarked about the "butterfly effect" that supposedly motivates the film's plot (i.e., the notion that a small local change in an unstable non-linear system-the flap of a butterfly's wing-can result in large differences on a higher level-a hurricane). On the story level this is perhaps true (the Japanese father's gun indeed sets off the Moroccan and Mexican catastrophes), but not on the narrative one. There can be no ethical responsibility on the part of the Japanese father for Yussef's action, which results, as noted above, from a mixture of sexually motivated bravado and mimetic rivalry with his brother. 20 The planetary point being made here is quite the opposite from the banal "weare-all-responsible-for-one-another" type of thing that some critics see in the movie's message. Rather, the film seems to be saying that ethical responsibility is first and foremost a local and, indeed, individual matter that is mediated by bio-socially defined culture. The film as a whole raises those local, particular matters to a higher plane-planetarity-in an aesthetically affirmative way but does not suggest any discursively guided resolution. The film makes the impossible possible by forcing us to apprehend very different ethical decisions and outcomes in terms of an aesthetic totality that always remains below the threshold of a semantic generalization. The totalizing gesture of the film-its double frame-forces us to turn inward towards the film's (human) particulars once again if we wish to understand it. However, it also forces us to consider what the demonstrably artificial and manipulative frame might be excluding.
The question thus necessarily arises as to whether the combined gesture of aesthetic totalization and a focus on individual ethical decisions leads to an "uncritical" attitude towards global and/or local power structures. This can be tested more closely by examining how public power and private ethical behavior interact in the plot. Here as elsewhere in the film, there does not seem to be any unity in the various outcomes. The different story lines are resolved through highly divergent combinations of political interventions and private gestures: the shooting of Ahmed, the capture of Yussef and his father by the Moroccan police, and Yussef's confession; the arrest and deportation of Amelia by the American Border Patrol and her reunification with her son; the rescue of Susan by the American authorities and Richard's leavetaking from his Moroccan guide; and the fatherly consolation of Chieko by the Japanese detective.
The film's argumentation here uses two overlapping, bio-socially defined archetypologies. The first is political and encompasses the relations between power, patriarchy, and individual dignity. In the Moroccan story, police power and patriarchal violence appear as mutually confirming practices: the Moroccan police officer slaps around the villagers in much the same way that the father slaps around his children, and the police officer threatens to "cut off [Yussef's] balls" if he is lying. Bio-social and political behaviors merge here into a punitive, degrading unity. Yussef, however, acts ethically in the sense that he takes the full burden of guilt upon himself (we later see this confirmed in a television image). In the second, Mexican-American case, state authority asserts itself in an impersonal and bureaucratic, though perhaps no less emasculating guise; it is the extended, intrusive actions of the studiously polite American border guard that eventually causes Emilia's nephew Santiago to bolt with the car (the dubious decision to abandon her and the children in the desert is all his own). Finally, in the Japanese story line, police authority dissolves into caring patriarchal behavior (that of the detective consoling Chieko in lieu of the absent father). On the highest plane, we have international diplomatic tensions between America and Morocco, which resists American claims, inspired by its global viewpoint rather than by knowledge of local conditions, that the tourist has been a victim of terrorism (it is an "arche" position lacking knowledge of typological, local particulars). The movie's archetypology is rooted in an analysis of immediate, face-to-face social relations with variable ethical choices and open-ended outcomes. It presents us with a (necessarily incomplete) typology of political and patriarchal power relations and-I think quite deliberately-does not attempt a sweeping ideological critique of those relations, which would involve returning to a discursive mode.
Instead, it argues by presenting us with a second archetypology that might be called "relations of caring" and that exists coextensively with the archetypology of patriarchal power relations. The Japanese detective Mamiya, Yussef's father, Emilia, the Moroccan translator, the American husband Richard, and even the American Border Patrol searching for the lost children all exhibit different kinds of caring behavior that intersect in unpredictable ways with patterns supplied by the film's archetypology of patriarchal power. The mere exertion of power does not exclude ethical, caring behavior (Detective Mamiya, the Border Patrol), and, conversely, a victimary or powerless status does not guarantee proper ethical action (as when Santiago abandons his aunt and the children in the desert, or when Yussef takes a potshot at the bus). By breaking up the story lines into discrete, juxtaposed chunks, the film reveals the specific interaction of the ethical and the political in an artificial, specifically aesthetic mode. On the one hand, we achieve a planetary, Godlike view of these relations, and on the other, we feel as if we are direct participants in them; our position as viewers is simultaneously universal and particular, authorial and figural.
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The reason for this is due not just to a personal whim of the moviemakers but is also structural, a result of the epistemic shift from the metaphysical pessimism of postmodernism to the metaphysical optimism of performatism. Spivak's postmodern ethics, which are representative of much of poststructuralist critical thinking, are rooted in resistance to an all-encompassing system of domination and exploitation that she calls "capitalist imperialism." 22 Capitalism as a means of production, though, has no real economic rival-if we take Spivak at her word, socialism "at its best" is parasitic upon capitalism but is not an autonomous means of production in its own right. 23 Hence also Spivak's emphasis on the alterity of pre-capitalist societies as a source of resistance 24 as well as upon the obscurity of local languages that cannot be assimilated to "hegemonic" languages like English. As Alain Badiou has pointed out in his essay on ethics and evil, the radical pathos of this and similar stances subordinates the political to the ethical. These positions assume the existence of a self-evident "radical Evil" from which the definition of Good is derived; consensus on this radical Evil is achieved through "opinion," which is to say discourse. 25 Good, rather than being a quantity that can be defined in terms of positive truth processes, is reduced to a set of human rights to the "non-Evil" (the right not to be mistreated, exploited, marginalized, etc.). Spivak's position, in sum, depends on the ethically motivated, "impossible" participation in the experience of being subaltern (of being other) and of protecting that subalternity from hegemonic exploitation. It is this experience or defense of otherness, rather than a positive political program or alternative economic mode of production, that confounds the hegemony of "imperialist capitalism." 26 How critical or politically relevant, then, is a movie like Babel, which avoids victimary logic and discursively founded ethics? In answering, a great deal depends on recognizing in it the quality or capability that I have called aesthetic. This aesthetic is not supplementary ornamentation-pretty images or snazzy editing meant to distract us from critical interrogation of the existing order-but is what gives the archetypologies their political bite. The archetypologies may be thought of in this sense as artistic practices that, to borrow a phrase of Jacques Rancière's, enact a "distribution of the sensible" that "disturbs the clear partition of identities, activities, and spaces." 27 The archetypologies impose new forms of artistically mediated order upon us that are analogous to the political destabilization of existing order, and they do this by appealing to the intuition rather than to discursive reason. It is noteworthy in this regard that Babel's presumably "contrived" aesthetic quite accurately anticipated numerous aspects of the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, for example, the rebellion was set off by the degradation of a single individual, Mohammed Bouazizi, an educated young man who was prevented by the police from earning money as a street vendor; his fiery, sacrificial suicide led to mass protests that eventually toppled the regime and then quickly spread to other countries, aided by both the mass media and social networking. The main driving force behind the uprisings was less programmatically guided discourse than mimesis-imitation of others' actions-and one of its main features seems to have been an attempt to assert individual dignity in the face of authoritarian repression (the uprising in Tunisia was originally dubbed "The Dignity Revolution"). Obviously, the way the Arab uprisings were conducted and the reasons they arose are much more complex and less coherent than anything that can be conveyed in a film. 28 However, Babel's archetypological approach managed to foreground a number of their crucial features before the fact: the importance of individual dignity and ethical responsibility, the high tech-aided mimesis by which the rebellions spread, and even the bio-social issue of women's right to show their own bodies within Islamic societies. 29 Thus, the film's supposedly "contrived" narrative form demonstrates the urgent need to grasp planetary developments both in terms of their temporal simultaneity and of their categorical overlap-the Arab uprisings not only took place more or less simultaneously but were also soon projected back onto Western experience (the "Occupy" movements in the West sometimes used the slogan "We are Tahrir Square"). Although Babel has been criticized, perhaps justifiably, as a compromise between auteur and Hollywood norms, 30 it is precisely this sort of formal compromise on which the performatist planetary perspective hinges: being able to intuit distant cultures will always remain an artificial, and necessarily incomplete, venture.
The Planetary: A Performatist Approach
I have chosen Babel as a point of departure not because it marks a new sub-genre or cycle of planetary narrative-the movie has not found any immediate imitators, and it is not likely to do so-but because it undertakes a radical "redistribution of the visible" that can help us rethink the way we approach narrative art after the end of postmodernism and critically address current global problems (and problems of globalization). Using Babel's radical aesthetic vision as a jumping-off point, I would like to provide a brief, three-point outline of how this vision can be used to help articulate a performatist approach to the planetary.
1. Politics of performatist planetarism. Performatist planetarism is an aesthetic and political project in the sense that this is used by Rancière, which is to say as the "sensible delimitation of what is common to the community."
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It would undertake the study of how archetypologies are used to order the world in narrative works of art (and, by extension, how they assert themselves in sociopolitical reality). Performatist planetarism would reconstruct the contours of local particulars but would simultaneously examine them in terms of overarching categorical assumptions about human social interaction. This project is "impossible" to achieve in the sense that "arche" (what is originary and general) and "typology" (what is empirical and particular) will never fall together entirely. Both perspectives are however necessary if we are not to fall into making abstract, a priori generalizations about human cultural behavior, on the one hand, or to fetishize its unrepresentable differences, on the other.
2. Anthropology of performatist planetarism. Performatist planetarism has a specific anthropological justification. It does not regard the human as a mere effect of language or discourse and stands in contradistinction to rhizomatic and deconstructive paradigms that use the term "human" to supplement discursive or relational figures. Instead, performatist planetarism tries to explain the human in terms of bio-social unities as they arise under different cultural conditions. These bio-social categories may be thought of (among other things) in terms of sexuality and human (dis)ability as well as in terms of caring vs. mimetically motivated violence, which arguably both have a partially biological basis. Planetary performatism studies the way the bio-social is projected onto the aesthetico-political (and vice versa). The goal is not to establish a rigorous system of binary categories resulting from their overlaps (that would be structuralism warmed over), but to engage in a kind of intuitionism that would reconstruct newly arising, aesthetically mediated archetypologies of the human in a global context. I also do not envision this intuitionism as a merely hermeneutic operation. As noted earlier, there already exist well-founded theories from thinkers like Gans, Marion, Sloterdijk, and Girard, which seek to describe the intuition or the mimetic aspects of human existence in categorical terms, and it would be imperative to draw on such theories when constructing archetypologies on a planetary level.
3. Agency in performatist planetarism. Performatist planetarism is interested in agency and event rather than in the endless, incremental play of discourse and with the resulting emphasis on failure, misprision, misrepresentation, contingency, and dysfunctionality. The point is not that agency and event are always positive and must always succeed, but that they act as catalysts for the archetypologies outlined above. Archetypologies in fact may be thought of as coalescing immediately around events or unexpected redistributions of order; they suggest (but do not guarantee) the possibility of change rather than the endless differentiation of that which has always already been, and they assume that bio-socially defined human agency-rather than discursively defined subjectivity-is the driving force behind such events. Agency, in turn, is linked closely with authorship, with the ability to produce closure and structure in the field of the real. The degree to which both humans and fictional characters can successfully "author" their reality is an important focal point of performatist planetary analysis.
The programmatic points outlined above can help us move beyond the endless reapplication of the poststructuralist critique of discourse, away from a totalizing critique of capitalism, and toward a more differentiated approach describing how human interaction takes place within a global capitalism that imposes constraints-but also opens up certain free spaces-for local cultures and the individuals acting within them.
Notes

